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N o t e s
1 . Died in 911 CE, the first Zaydi imam in Yemen.
2 . This encounter took place in 1994 during the
author’s fieldwork.
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One of the salient features of religious life in Yemen
in the modern period has been the fading of histori-
cally rooted Yemeni forms of Islam. Zaydi scholars,
for example, have been reduced to a minority group
within the body of the u l a m a and have little say in the
running of the country’s affairs. The Shafici Sufis of
the Hadramaut have faired even worse. The most vis-
ible form of Islam, and the one actively promoted by
the state, claims to be above the sectarian identities
of the Yemenis and ultimately adheres to the Salafi
school. This requires explanation since Salafism is
not usually associated with Yemen’s religious and in-
tellectual history.
The Entrenchment of
’ N o n - S e c t a r i a n ’
Sunnism in Yemen
The most commonly invoked name in offi-
cial government discourse on religion and
law in contemporary Yemen is by far that of
Muhammad b. cA l i al-Shawkani (d. 1834).
Shawkani was the chief judge of the Qasimi
imamate in the late 18t h and early 19t h c e n-
turies who had, through his writings and
political activities, attempted to mould
Yemen’s legal and political environment in a
Sunni fashion. Shawkani was a Traditionist
Sunni, or Salafi, who claimed that his legal
and religious opinions were derived from a
direct interface with the primary sources of
revelation (Q u r ' a n and Hadith), and not
from the derivative works of the established
schools of law. In so doing, he negates the
multiple legal and sectarian divisions of lat-
ter-day Muslims. For him, most of the juridi-
cal textual legacy from the time of revela-
tion could be ignored in favour of the teach-
ings of m u j t a h i d scholars like himself. Em-
bedded in Shawkani’s teachings was a call
for reform and an overhaul of Islamic legal
thought, elements which would later appeal
to Muslim states as well as modernist intel-
lectuals, who saw in his ideas a means of re-
forming their own societies.
Shawkani’s vision of social and political
order involved establishing a bureaucratic
state, the centre of which would be a top-
ranking jurist, a chief judge like himself. This
jurist would have to have an independent
intellect and be the ‘renewer’ of collective
truth; in short, the source to which scholars
and rulers alike should properly resort. The
shift from Zaydism to Sunnism, which
Shawkani had a central hand in effecting,
was part of larger transformations in Qasimi
state structures. The Qasimi imams, who
ruled Yemen from the 17t h to the 19t h c e n-
turies, were interested in establishing a dy-
nastic state in the 18t h century. Shawkani’s
vision accommodated their needs; hence an
alliance was struck whereby Traditionist
scholars legitimized the rule of the Qasimi
imams and in return, the imams provided
patronage in the form of appointments and
p r o t e c t i o n .
In the Yemeni context, a clear and distinct
chain of Shawkani students has perpetuat-
ed his legacy to the present day. Shawkani’s
status as the symbol of both Yemeni nation-
alism and pan-Islamic reformist thought in a
Sunni Traditionist mode has risen consider-
ably since the Yemeni republican revolution
in 1962. In addition to major avenues,
schools and university halls being named
after him, the republic promotes the editing
of his works, and officially subscribes to his
Traditionist interpretation of Islam. Appeal
to his ideas and symbolic status as a much-
recognized pan-Islamic reformer has proven
to be an effective tool in silencing the more
traditional Zaydi opponents of the republi-
can regime. Briefly stated, the argument
against the traditional Zaydis runs as fol-
lows: Zaydism’s intrinsic moderation and
acceptance of m u j t a h i d s allowed a figure
like Shawkani to emerge from within the
school and be patronized by the Qasimi
imams. Therefore, Shawkani’s understand-
ing of Islam is in fact consistent with the t r u e
teachings of Zaydism. The not so negligible
affirmation that Shawkani systematically at-
tempted to demolish the teachings of the
Zaydi school in a number of his works is in-
variably passed over in silence.
Another reason for the allure of Salafi
Islam in Yemen is the fact that elements in
Shawkani’s teachings resonate with specifi-
cally modern Muslim concerns about Islam’s
decline and the necessity for renewal and
rejuvenation. By monopolizing his dis-
course, the Yemeni state has garnered for it-
self an efficient means to instituting a more
standard, or what can be termed ‘generic
Sunni’, interpretation of Islam. And because
Shawkani’s Salafism has a considerable fol-
lowing across the Muslim world, all provin-
cial and historically rooted conceptions and
practices of Islam can be attacked for being
a t a v i s t i c .
The extent to which this ‘generic Sunnism’
has become dominant in Yemen can be
gleaned semiotically by looking at the way
most Yemenis pray in mosques nowadays in
the regions considered to be Zaydi. Like Ma-
likis – but unlike S h a f ici s, Hanafis and Han-
balis – Zaydis practise the i r s a l while praying
(i.e. they do not place the right hand over
the left, a practice referred to as d a m m, but
keep their hands lowered to their sides).
Very few Yemenis practise the i r s a l n o w a-
days, and some even make a point of pray-
ing in a non-Zaydi fashion. Though anecdo-
tal, these and other bodily practices are im-
portant markers of religious identity and re-
veal a shift to a more Salafi practice of Islam.
Encounter with a tribesman2
In S acd a, the traditional Zaydi bastion in
the country, was a 22-year-old tribesman
from cU s a y m a t, historically a Zaydi tribe of
Hashid. He had been recently recruited by
al-Amn al-Siyasi (political security service).
When asked about the local Zaydis’ com-
plaints that their tombs were being dese-
crated and destroyed by the students of the
scientific institute (where the tribesman had
been educated) and other ‘Wahhabi’ sym-
pathizers, his answer was categorical: ‘The
Hadawis are practising reprehensible inno-
vations [sing. b i dca] when they visit their
tombs and erect grave stones and domes
over them. This is contrary to Islam and
must be stopped.’ 
He insisted on referring to the local Zaydis
as Hadawis, revealing that he had accepted
a feature in the propaganda war that is
waged against them by Sunni Islamists. This
consists in asserting that Zayd b. cA l i ( t h e
eponym of the Zaydis) did not establish a
school or sect – thus no one has the right to
use his name – and that it was the ardent
followers of al-Hadi Yahya b. a l - H u s a y n1 w h o
had established a wayward sect, thereby
placing themselves beyond the pale of or-
thodoxy. Furthermore, his statement about
visiting tombs clearly indicates that this
young man had imbibed and accepted the
Traditionist/Wahhabi discourse on graves –
an important leitmotif in their literature. The
proof offered for his assertions was a recita-
tion of a number of Sunni prophetic tradi-
tions about the reprehensibility of erecting
and visiting graves. Perhaps the most re-
markable feature of this encounter is that
this man no longer identified with the his-
torical school to which his forefathers had
belonged, and he had the intellectual and
scriptural wherewithal to vilify it. In compar-
ison with his tribal ancestors, his knowledge
of Islam was more considerable, but the
content and the forms it took bore closer
affinity with that of a contemporary Islamist
in Riyadh.
The way Zaydis have coped
Republican state policies have effectively
marginalized traditional Zaydi scholars from
the political arena. With few notable excep-
tions, such scholars have not benefited in
terms of administrative or political appoint-
ments. Zaydis often speak of a combined
onslaught by the state and by the Wah-
habis, whose influence has been especially
significant in the S acd a province. The only
organized effort by Zaydis to reclaim influ-
ence has come belatedly with the establish-
ment of Hizb al-Haqq (The Party of Truth) in
1990 after the unification of the two
Yemens. Al-Haqq’s general secretary, Sayyid
Ahmad b. Muhammad al-Shami, does not
mince words in explaining why the party
was established:
It is implicit here that the republican gov-
ernment has allowed this to take place and
is therefore guilty by association. Politically,
al-Haqq has proved ineffectual. It won only
two seats in the 1993 parliamentary elec-
tions and none in 1997. In part, this is due to
the ambiguous nature of a Zaydi political
party operating in a republican context
where it is all too easy to identify it with a
call for reviving the imamate. In an unsuc-
cessful attempt to clarify matters, al-Shami
and other eminent Zaydi scholars issued a
statement in which they declare their aban-
donment of the institution of the imamate.
The imamate, they assert, is a historical con-
struct that is no longer valid. The most im-
portant matter for the present age is to at-
tend to the welfare (s a l a h) and the better-
ment (i s l a h) of the Muslim community. The
latter, alone, has the right to appoint a
leader, who is not an imam in the strict
sense, but rather a hired servant (a j i r). Final-
ly, this Muslim leader may be descended
from any lineage and belong to any race as
long as the affairs of the u m m a are safe and
sound. The institution which once defined
Zaydism was thus done away with in a few
p a g e s .
A number of Zaydi scholars do not agree
with the positions taken by al-Haqq’s lead-
ership, whether it is on the issue the ima-
mate or regarding participation in the polit-
ical processes in Sana’a. They remain for-
mally outside the party, preferring to lead a
Look, Saudi Arabia is pouring lots and
lots of money into Yemen to promote its
own version of Wahhabi Islam. This is ac-
tually an irrational and uncompromising
version of our religion, which we can do
without. So, we need to counter those ef-
forts… and to fight intellectual advances
by Wahhabism into Yemen.
life on the geographical and political mar-
gins of Yemen. When unable to change an
unjust regime, Zaydism advocates the prac-
tice of ‘emigration’ (h i j r a) from the abode of
injustice to a more secure area where a life
devoted to righteous living can be pursued.
A number of leading Zaydis, such as Majd al-
Din a l - Mu ca y y a d i and Badr al-Din al-Huthi,
live in rural areas where they teach. Thus far,
no one has claimed the imamate. Instead,
the more senior scholars have encouraged a
younger generation of Zaydi activists to
pursue activities in the fields of education,
religious exhortation, and the editing and
publication of Zaydi manuscripts. The two
most prominent men of this younger gener-
ation are al-Murtada al-Mahatwari and
Muhammad cI z z a n.
By and large, the efforts of traditional Zay-
dis to resuscitate their vision of religious
and political order have been limited and
mainly defensive, reacting to policies un-
dertaken by the state or their Salafi oppo-
nents. Both in ideological and political
terms, the response of the Zaydis has been
meagre, being confined to the publication
of texts and the establishment of a small
number of schools and institutes. The story
of the Zaydis and their detractors continues
to unfold, but the outcome appears to have
been determined in the mid-18t h c e n t u r y
when the state chose to support Traditionist
scholars such as Shawkani, whose intellec-
tual heirs continue to dominate the juridical
and political scene in Yemen. ◆
